Whatever happened to commemorating the “Belfast Blitz”

This week marks the 72nd anniversary of the “Belfast Blitz”, which was, by most reckonings, the most deadly Luftwaffe attack in the British Isles outside London during World War II. It went almost unmarked.

It had a significant impact. In addition to hundreds killed, thousands were displaced – including my own mother, then a small child, who was forced from Fortwilliam to Doagh and ultimately to Cookstown for the rest of the War.

At the weekend some people thought it a good idea to put up flags commemorating Carson, Craig and the UVF. A few weeks ago, it was the Easter Rising. A few months before that, it was the Ulster Covenant. Some or all of these may be legitimate, but they are nevertheless innately sectarian, one-sided commemorations celebrating something which some other fellow citizens do not see as cause for celebration.

The ‘Belfast Blitz’ was different. For the thousands affected, it mattered not if they were Protestant, Catholic or dissenting. So, why no commemoration?

It could be that the ‘Belfast Blitz’ isn’t worth commemorating because it doesn’t provide an opportunity to ‘annoy the other side’. It could be that it isn’t worth commemorating because in fact it is somewhat embarrassing – emphasising the callous incompetence of much of the Unionist administration while at the same time highlighting Nationalists’ willingness, in too many instances, even to endorse fascism on the grounds of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ (neither of these exactly fits neatly with Unionists’ ideals around efficiency or Nationalists’ ideals around human rights).

Perhaps that is too cynical – perhaps it isn’t worth commemorating because it isn’t an especial anniversary. However, 2016 will be the 75th anniversary. We shall see…

The collapse of democracy

Jason O’Mahony - http://jasonomahony.ie/beware-the-new-fascism-you-might-not-even-recognise-it/ – has a superb cautionary note which is ultimately about the collapse of Western Democracy.

I would not, perhaps, have used the word “fascism” but I understand his point completely. Northern Ireland is far from unique in having governing parties who justify anything – including blatant breakdowns in the Rule of Law – to remain in power (and justify remaining in power solely on the grounds of stopping others having it).

I have long cautioned here that what began in 2007 was not an economic collapse but a democratic collapse. Mediterranean countries have led the way, but what is to stop everyone else following?

Time to grow European Movement with facts, not fiction

I was honoured to be elected Chair of the European Movement in Northern Ireland at Belfast City Hall on Tuesday evening.

For memory, my remarks on taking the Chair:

“I feel, whether or not the referendum on the EU actually happens, we now at least have the opportunity to have the debate about Europe and to raise the profile what it means for Northern Ireland to be part of the European Union.

“I personally think we should look at Northern Ireland as a natural bridge between the European Union and North America, and seek to capitalise on that position – look at a map of Europe and we are peripheral, but look at the map of the Western World and we are right in the middle of it. It is not a matter of choosing one over the other.

“To be clear, if the people of the UK opt to leave the European Union on the basis of the facts, I personally will accept that. What I will not accept is their opting to leave the European Union on the basis of fiction.

“Therefore, the Movement’s role in Northern Ireland over the next four years or so will be to present facts about the EU clearly. We are only a voluntary organisation, but we will take every opportunity we can to communicate our message – through the media, in schools, in Assembly Questions.

“We are living in interesting times and we have the opportunity now place the European Union, and the reality of Northern Ireland’s membership of it and role within it, at the heart of the political debate. As we do so, we will ensure that debate is around the facts, not the fiction.”

Scotland, Catalonia, and defeating terrorism

ITV’s James Mates, in his reaction to Catalonia’s recent Assembly Election, wisely noted that in fact Catalonia was leading the charge towards a referendum on independence, even though it was the Basque Country which had had the terrorist campaign about it.

He then rather reversed his point by suggesting it was a bit like Wales having an independence referendum before Scotland. No, James, it is like Scotland having one before Northern Ireland – which is what is happening! He was generous enough to accept this point in response to my note directly to him on the subject.

For the point, both in Spain and the UK, is obvious, it is fundamental, and it needs to be shouted from the rooftop – terrorism failed. ETA’s grubby and pointless campaign of terror delivered 800 deaths – but in fact the Basques are now further away from independence than the Catalans! The IRA’s unnecessary conflict saw 3,600 deaths, more than half committed directly by them – polls show a whopping 7% of Northern Ireland’s population would vote themselves out f the UK tomorrow, whereas in Scotland it will be at least a quarter and quite possibly nearer a half!

The lesson must instantly be learned. You do not win hearts and minds through bombs and bullets. Batasuna must admit that; Sinn Fein must admit that; we all must emphasise that – and then, democratically, we can work together to make our homelands peaceful and prosperous.

Attwood’s laws will make roads no safer

I have long suspected the Department of the Environment’s proposed various legal changes – particularly around “graduated driver licensing” and reducing the drink-drive limit – were a complete waste of time.

Wesley Johnston is too polite to say it directly, but his excellent analysis confirms my suspicion.

Yet again, as in yesterday’s post, we have: a) a misreading of the evidence; and b) proposed solutions which are neither practical nor viable.

Firstly, proposals were brought forward by the previous DUP Minister for “graduated driver licensing”, because obviously young people are at more risk on our roads.

Or are they…?

2012 NI road fatalities per billion km travelled (Credit: Wesley Johnston)

Well, er, no, not any more. In fact, males over 60 are by far the most likely group to be killed on our roads. That is not to say that the bleedin’ obvious does not apply at all – young drivers are marginally more likely to cause accidents than the above would indicate. However, what was once a clear case of young and inexperienced drivers causing significant numbers of casualties no longer applies anything like as markedly as it once did – and that, with no change in the law.

Secondly, my particular bugbear is the proposal to reduce the current drink-driving limit to, in effect, half its current rate – effectively from typically two glasses of wine to typically one glass of wine. Let us ask the simple question: why?

We do not yet have the figures for 2012 but we can reliably predict them: the total number of fatalities on Northern Ireland’s roads where drugs or alcohol was a prime factor was, in all probability, just two. Two more than the objective, of course. But still two. They were a significant factor, in all likelihood, in six or seven. Now, let us ask another question: how many of those were caused by someone having had two glasses of wine rather than one? And how many were caused by someone completely ignoring the law and driving way over the existing limit and/or with drugs in their system?

Even recently, tens of people were being killed each year on Northern Ireland’s roads by drunk drivers alone. That is now single figures, and probably low single figures – tragic, of course, but a vast, vast improvement. And this, with no change in the law.

As I noted last week, Northern Ireland’s road fatality rate has dropped dramatically – much faster than in neighbouring jurisdictions and to a level which may be the lowest anywhere in the world. And this, with no change in the law.

Too many politicians are inclined to come up with changes in the law for the sake of change. In fact, Northern Ireland’s relative success in this area – and in others, frankly – was down to a change in attitude brought about by campaigns and, frankly, civic common sense. There were changes to enforcement (the police have moved more to enforcement on more dangerous single carriageways, which have become comparatively safer than any other road type as a result), and even changes to departmental policy (albeit in DRD, not DoE, through the adoption of a policy where possible to build all new major dual carriageways “left exit only”, i.e. with no turns across traffic and thus no risk of head-on collision – such as already on the A1 Newry Bypass and A4 Ballygawley extension, and soon on the A8 Belfast-Larne and A5 through Tyrone). But there was no change in the law.

We often see politicians as needing legal skills. In fact, what they maybe need most prominently are leadership and management skills. There are other areas where this applies too – tackling binge drinking, for example. Subtle changes in priority or policy can often achieve much… with no change in the law.

US and guns – it’s just not that simple

All cats have four legs. My dog has four legs. Therefore my dog is a cat.

It is an obvious logical fallacy. Yet it is incredible how many people buy into it when it comes to government and politics!

Guns kill people. There are lots of guns in the United States. Therefore the United States’ high murder rate is down to its guns.

Sam Harris demonstrates the fallacy. It takes him a while, but we can do it with evidence closer to home.

Gun ownership in the United States is very, very high – there are as many guns as people, in fact. Its homicide rate is very high too – at 50 per million people, it is more than quadruple the rate in Northern Ireland (12), the Republic of Ireland (12) and England & Wales (11).

So, two things appear obvious: first, there is a high murder rate in the United States because there are guns; second, this could be solved by banning them. This is a classic case of misreading the evidence and then proposing a solution which is not viable – something all too common in politics.

Harris convincingly demonstrates that, in fact, the precise reverse is the case – there are guns in the United States because there is a high murder rate. Harris rightly dismissed the “Second Amendment Rights” argument and yet the constitutional aspect is relevant – the United States was born as a more individualistic society than almost any other in the western world, and one which values individual liberty much more highly than any other – that is, in fact, what distinguishes it from elsewhere. Although in the absence of guns the murder rate would almost certainly decline, it wouldn’t be by much – certainly nothing like enough to bring it into line with that of the British Isles.

(I omitted, above, the figure for Scotland – which, in fact, stands at 16 per million. Although this is much lower than the United States, it is much higher than anywhere else in the British Isles, and has been consistently so since the end of the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ – it is, in fact, the second highest in the European Union. Is this because Scotland has more guns than England and Ireland? Evidently not. In fact, Northern Ireland surely remains by far the most armed part of the British Isles, yet its murder rate is slap bang on the average. So, plainly, high murder rates are not always to do with guns.)

Then, of course, there is the solution – “ban all guns”. How, exactly? Banning their sale is theoretically possible, of course, but how do you “decommission” the 300 million guns already out there? And, er, are you sure that’s what you really want to do? Surely the police would still have guns? If the police still has them, the logical progression is that security personnel, even private security personnel, may have them. If security personnel may have them, the logical progression is that all those who need them for work – say, deer hunters – should have them. If deer hunters should have them, well, pretty much anyone trained should have them, surely?

It is easy, from thousands of miles away, to look on with derision and point to the bleedin’ obvious. Yet, looked at in detail, suddenly it’s not so bleedin’ obvious – and unbelievably difficult in practice to implement. Goodness knows the United States has its faults, but it is hardly backward! There are deeply ingrained historical, cultural and social reasons for high levels of gun ownership there, and for the high murder rate. On reflection, however, they are not connected in the way which is initially apparent; and even insofar as they are, cultural and social change is an incredibly difficult thing to manage. It’s not rocket science – if it were, the Americans would long since have cracked it!

The West will inflate its way out of recession – and punish the poor

Attention on the latest strong offering from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) was on its suggestion that the majority of people who are in poverty are in work. Anti-poverty organisations like to seize upon this suggestion as evidence that the current welfare reform agenda is wrong-headed, because its focus on getting people into work may not necessarily get them out of poverty. It is not the welfare reform agenda which is wrong-headed – it is the economic agenda being adhered to right across the Western World.

What is noticeable about the JRF figures is not that benefits payments (either before or after reform) appear low – they don’t; it is that the amount of money required merely to support ourselves appears incredibly high – the notion that £18,400 a year is only a living wage for parents is frightening. Conventional thinking on economic policy is causing this – and it is this, not the thinking around welfare reform, which must be challenged and changed.

Let us first of all dismiss the idea that a welfare reform agenda focused on getting people into work is wrong-headed. It may well be true that the majority of people experiencing relative poverty are in work; however, it is equally true that 99% of those out of work experience poverty. So yes, if you have work it does not guarantee you will not still be in poverty; but if you are out of work, it guarantees you will be. Making work central to welfare reform is necessary for various other reasons too – work is a means creating social networks which provide a route out of social exclusion; work is a means of enhancing self-esteem; work is a means of building a career, which may ultimately result in creating work for others (whereas no one out of work can do so); and so on. My own research on the subject showed that very few people do not want to work. In fact, most people will seek work given fair early years services, fair educational provision, and fair public service provision (e.g. child care). It is also entirely reasonable to ensure work pays – very often, under the current system, a parent reliant on housing support actually loses out financially by taking part-time work – the classic poverty trap, as it disables them from starting a career and thus moving towards not just financial stability but also social inclusion. To be clear, therefore, a welfare system focused on support and encouragement for people to find and get to work is an improvement on the current one.

Fundamentally, the poor are going to be punished not as a result of the welfare system, but as a result of inflation. The Western World has two basic options at this juncture: it can face up to the reality that spending (government, business and personal) has become ludicrously inefficient and reduce it by making reasonable decisions about what spending is or is not efficient; or it can inflate its way out, leaving current levels of spending as they are but increasing the cost of living so that the money spent cannot buy as much as it previously did. This is not a matter of left or right; it is a matter of doing the responsible thing or doing the easy thing. Sadly but predictably, we have opted for the latter.

How do we judge “efficiency”? The book Why England Lose explains that the correlation between a Premier League club’s spending on player wages and its final league position is high, at 92% – in other words, money spent on player wages, even if outrageously high to most of us, is efficient; on the other hand, the correlation between a Premier League club’s spending on transfers and its final league position is low, at just 17% – in other words, money spent on buying players is incredibly inefficient. Clubs do the latter because fans want them to – any club losing three games in a row faces instant demands for a new striker or winger. Yet there is little evidence that meeting these demands will do any good; in fact, if anything, they should be demanding higher wages…

Contrary to popular belief, politicians, like football managers, are only human. Faced by demands for big or new spending on things which are perceived to be easy solutions but are in fact wildly inefficient, they are inclined to yield – only the very best politicians (and football managers) don’t. Therefore, as a society right across the Western world, we have failed to enter into a debate about where spending is absolutely necessary on one hand, and where it could reasonably be reduced on the other. Football managers continue to throw money on transfer fees when it would probably be more efficiently spent on player wages; politicians continue to throw money at large hospitals where it would probably be more efficiently spent on local health centres; people continue to throw money at television subscriptions where it would probably be more efficiently spent on books. Football managers buy players they don’t need just because they are out of contract; politicians build roads where they are not required just because the land is available; people buy food they then throw away just because it is on special offer.

Thus, we will simply allow the price of things to rise while keeping spending where it is. This would be fine, if there were no penalty. But there is – and the outrageous thing is that penalty will be paid by the poorest. The consequence of “inflating our way out” of the problem is that politicians will get away relatively unharmed because they are perceived to have maintained wages and benefits at their current levels; yet those wages and benefits will not go as far as they once did. Those already up the career ladder will be able to find ways to earn more money to make up at least part of the difference; but those on fixed incomes, typically the poorest, will not.

It is outrageous that we are meekly letting this happen, rather than seek to deliver more efficient spending programmes at all levels – in government, in business, even in private households. Collectively, we are punishing the poor – and worst of all, through focusing on false arguments about welfare reform and public spending levels, we are pretending otherwise.

We have to learn to deal with the past

I have already challenged the usefulness of the word “reconciliation” on this blog but, since the issue of the “past” continues to be prominent, I will return to it.

I am in little doubt that the majority view concerning the past in Northern Ireland was the one expressed to me at a “Youth Talk” event in Derry on Friday – namely that we should draw a line under it and move on. I would argue two things in response to that: firstly, yes, politicians should draw a line under it and move on; but secondly, no, we cannot leave dealing with the past to an entirely unmanaged process because it would leave too many injustices unresolved.

Firstly, we cannot leave the issue to be led by politicians for reasons which were obvious on Friday morning’s Nolan programme and indeed long before. To be specific: not only do politicians disagree on the past, they actually gain from disagreeing on the past, and they know it. The whole Unionist/Nationalist communal split is constructed on a disagreement about the past – and specifically on a biased sense of grievance and blame. Can’t deal with internal party divisions? Challenge Sinn Fein to apologise for 30 years of violence! Can’t deal with welfare reform? Challenge Unionists to apologise for 50 years of misrule! Actually agreeing on the past would weaken their power base, depriving them of the communal biases upon which those bases are almost invariably built – and, to make matters worse, it might force them to take concrete and viable positions on real issues.

So, we can rule politicians out of the equation, at least in terms of providing any genuine leadership on the issue.

Secondly, however, we are faced with a reality that many of us still have a genuine sense of injustice. This comes in all kinds of forms: some relatives still do not know what happened to their loved ones or who did it, and want to find out (others do not, it should be noted); some people more broadly dispute certain equations, perhaps wishing to raise ‘Bloody Sunday 1972′ above ‘Deal 1989′, or ‘Enniskillen 1987′ over ‘Gibraltar 1988′, or to prioritise ‘Bloody Friday 1972′ or ‘Teebane 1992′ or ‘Loughinisland 1994′ for one particular reason or another, some genuine, some less so; some people simply find it outrageous that apologists for the IRA or even Ulster Resistance are now leading our devolved government. If we leave it to an unmanaged process, it will continue to be a thorn used to heighten that injustice (and abused to maintain our communal-based political system).

So, how do we deal with it? That would need an answer from someone much more expert than I am. However, a few frequently suggested things will definitely not work:

- there can be no ‘truth’, because too many people refuse to tell it;

- there can be no ‘reconciliation’, because there was no ‘conciliation’ to start with;

- there will be few ‘apologies’, because no workable process can be led by the people who need to provide them; and

- there can be no ‘just drawing a line’ because too many injustices remain unresolved.

A few other things do spring to mind:

- ‘Republicans’ (however defined) will never issue a ‘one-off apology’ but could well reach the stage where the logical progression of their political representatives’ stated position they have apologised and accepted as ‘wrong’ every atrocity they carried out, thus rendering their campaign universally regarded as futile; and

- the UK Government could tell the truth about some incidents without the need for a full-blown ‘inquiry’, and there may be a means of prioritising those incidents (to achieve the prime objective of ‘resolving injustice’ as opposed to ‘truth’ or ‘reconciliation’ or any such) to the stage that, quickly, relatives of innocent victims of state violence know that that innocence is recognised.

This will not be popular, but there is a term for what, essentially, I am proposing: Vergangenheitsbewältigung. People may be immediately discomforted by the parallel, but here’s a thought: Vergangenheitsbewältigung unquestionably worked.

In other words, I take the view that far from “drawing a line”, what we need to do is come to terms with the past as part of moving into our future – and do so as a civic society, not as a remote political issue.

The models we have looked at elsewhere have not demonstrably achieved that; but there are models which have. However discomforting the parallels may be, that discomfort is as nothing to going through the process; and the discomfort of going through the process is as nothing compared to the discomfort of not going through it…

US Elections, historical settlement and political polling in NI…

The cry goes up every four years: “So, what can we learn from the American elections?”

The answer, as usual, is really not very much. We are often fooled into thinking the United States is a more similar country to us that it actually is because we speak (roughly) the same language. It is in fact just as foreign as France or Germany, even if it seems more accessible at times.

However, one thing we can learn is good polling and sensible use of it.

Northern Ireland’s current parliamentary constituencies may usefully be split into groups for polling and evidence purposes.

Northern Ireland’s 18 constituencies may usefully be split two ways, and then subdivided a further two ways:

In grey, we have the “Greater Belfast” constituencies. Collectively, these were not formally planted but were informally planted (predominantly by Scots) and subsequently industrialized. They may usefully be split into the predominantly urban electorates (the “Belfast City” constituencies) and predominantly suburban electorates (the “Belfast Suburbs” constituencies).

In purple, we have the “Rural & Border” constituencies. To the south (lighter shade), we have the “Border” constituencies which, with the exception of South Down, were formally planted predominantly by English settlers – with the exception of Upper Bann, they have Catholic majorities and with the exception of South Down they have an Anglican majority among Protestants. To the north (darker shade), we have the “Ullans” constituencies which were planted in various ways ultimately predominantly by Scots (all have more Presbyterians than Anglicans).

I state the religious make-up primarily for religious reasons. There is also a linguistic divide – the “Greater Belfast” constituencies typically display a “Belfast accent”; the “Border” constituencies typically have “Mid-Ulster English”; the “Ullans” constituencies typically have “Ulster Scots”. The boundaries are not perfect, but fairly close.

Within Nationalism, this makes little difference, the swing to Sinn Fein from SDLP has been fairly consistent from 1998 to 2011 Assembly Elections (Sinn Fein figure on left):

SF	SDLP	Belfast City		Belfast Suburbs		Border (Rural)		Ullans (Rural)
1998		23%	18%	3%	10%	23%	30%	22%	28%
2003		28%	16%	5%	9%	32%	21%	28%	21%
2007		31%	14%	8%	7%	36%	19%	29%	20%
2011		29%	12%	6%	7%	38%	18%	30%	18%

With Unionism, however, the distinction is stark. The Ulster Unionists have always been stronger in the suburbs and the Border area – in other words, in areas of higher English settlement.

The trends are different too. In 2011, there was a clear swing to the Ulster Unionists from the DUP in the Border area in 2011; yet in urban and suburban Belfast and in rural areas of higher Scottish settlement the Ulster Unionist decline continued (albeit in the latter case partly self-inflicted by the McClarty debacle and the absence of any candidate at all in Foyle). Below, the Ulster Unionist share appears on the left in comparison to the DUP on the right:

UU	DUP	Belfast City		Belfast Suburbs		Border (Rural)		Ullans (Rural)
1998		15%	17%	30%	19%	20%	14%	17%	24%
2003		18%	25%	34%	31%	21%	20%	17%	29%
2007		12%	26%	20%	43%	15%	22%	12%	31%
2011		9%	28%	17%	46%	17%	20%	8%	30%

The Alliance vote is well known to be geographically limited to the Greater Belfast constituencies – where in fact it is the second largest party in local government and third largest in the Assembly.

However, interestingly, the trend in this case is only markedly different in the four Belfast constituencies – right across Northern Ireland, since 2003 the party has enjoyed steady growth (but lower outside Belfast than in the Belfast constituencies themselves):

Alliance	Belfast City	Belfast Suburbs	Border (Rural)	Ullans (Rural)
1998	8%	14%	2%	3%
2003	4%	9%	1%	1%
2007	8%	12%	1%	2%
2011	13%	15%	3%	3%

What does this tell us about likely future outcomes? The key, as ever, is the trend.

2014: The European Election is pan-Northern Ireland, and that is important. The above tables would hint that the Alliance vote share may come close to or even level with the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists; in practice, this is unlikely, as turn-out is significantly higher in rural areas (which favours the latter two). The only potential change we could deem ‘likely’ (or at least ‘highly conceivable’) would be two DUP seats (the second at the expense of the Ulster Unionists), but I doubt this will even be attempted. Remember, in more than a quarter of NI – and a quarter with high turnout – the DUP is barely ahead of the Ulster Unionists at all; for two seats, it has to win by more than 2:1 (in fact probably more like 5:2).

2015: The Westminster Election is much more interesting. The only Unionist seat in the “Border” area is Upper Bann, where the Ulster Unionists are indeed closing on the DUP. The trend indicates it will be close. Similarly, the Alliance vote is picking up fastest in the “Belfast City” constituencies – which bodes well not only for a defence of Belfast East, but even conceivably a challenge at Belfast South.

2016: The likely date of the next Assembly Election sees the trends given another year’s movement. By then, the Alliance vote may surpass even Sinn Fein’s in the “Greater Belfast” constituencies, threatening close to wipe-out for the Ulster Unionists and SDLP in many of them. However, the Ulster Unionists may even have moved ahead of the DUP in the “Border” constituencies by this stage, making life interesting particularly in Upper Bann and Fermanagh/South Tyrone. In this case, unlike in 2014, the Alliance Party has a “turnout advantage”, with fewer votes needed to win seats in “Greater Belfast” than in the “Rural & Border” ones, and thus the potential to draw closer to the Ulster Unionists and SDLP in terms of seats won even without speeding up the swing in terms of the popular vote.

Of course, this all needs much broader analysis. However, what is clear is that different parts of Northern Ireland, with their different histories, respond differently to political events and partisan swings.

Events may, of course, change everything. However, the current trends indicate the Ulster Unionists will become increasingly defined to the border area, but may in fact increase their vote in that area to the extent that the European seat is certainly not lost and a parliamentary seat even comes back into view. On trends alone, I would worry more about the SDLP - I am not sure a coalition of Foyle, South Down and South Belfast is viable in the longer term (not least when boundary changes wipe at least one of them out, as they surely will eventially).

All of this is conjecture. However, what we can definitely learn from American elections is how to watch the trends. Northern Ireland’s political trends are under-researched – in fact, they vary significantly in different areas, and can even be predicted from patterns of historical settlement. So can America’s, of course…

In the United States, states associated with slavery in the 19th century and racial segregation in the 20th are those, along with former territories, which are most likely to vote for Republican Presidential candidates in the 21st century.

Guide to watching Presidential Election in British Isles

The Financial Times and others have it Obama 237, Romney 191 in the race to 270 “electoral votes” on election day itself. So how do we determine through the night (as it is in Europe) who is likely to reach the target?

The toss-ups not included in the above total, from east to west, are New Hampshire (4), Virginia (13), North Carolina (15), Florida (29), Ohio (18), Wisconsin (10), Iowa (6), Colorado (9) and Nevada (6).

Let’s cheat a bit – I think we can give Wisconsin, Iowa and Nevada to Obama too, giving him another 22 for 259 – for viewers, the only point of interest is whether the networks “call” them immediately (based on exit polls) or wait for a significant proportion of the count to be complete before placing them definitively in the incumbent’s column. If it is the latter, it is good news for Romney as it means he is probably at the upper end of the margin of error in the polls, but I would not read too much into it either way.

This all means victory in both of Colorado and New Hampshire or in any other single state puts Obama over the magic number.

In other words, to win, I reckon Romney needs all four of Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, Ohio; plus one of New Hampshire or Colorado.

(That said, there is usually at least one total freak state which threatens to throw the maths somewhat – let us assume that threat does not turn into reality!)

So when will viewers in the UK and Ireland need to be watching (links are to analysis of each state over on Slugger by Gerry Lynch of Belfast-based polling firm LucidTalk)?

23.00 GMT: Polls begin to close in some eastern states. We should have little indication of the outcome, however, as networks are barred from making any projections for another hour.

Midnight GMT: Virginia polls close. If it is called immediately for either candidate, that means that candidate has won comfortably and obviously that is extremely good news for the winner – I would go so far to say that if it is called immediately, the winner will win the election (if Obama wins, it’s over anyway as per the above maths; if Romney wins comfortably, the polls are obviously terribly wrong at least in Virginia and quite possibly elsewhere, with even the “toss-up” states I have discounted above coming back into play). But I don’t think it will be called!

At this time, each of Georgia, Kentucky and South Carolina should be called for Romney, and Vermont for Obama - if any of that does not happen, it is good news for the opponent. Indiana should also be called for Romney, though some networks may not risk it immediately.

If Romney is leading 44-3 at this stage, it’s in line with expectations – so probably worth staying up!

00.30 GMT: Ohio and North Carolina polls close. As with Virginia, if Ohio is called immediately, it is extremely good news for the winner. If North Carolina is not called immediately, it is bad news for Romney. Again, I suspect neither will be called (the networks have been very wary since the 2000 debacle), but the winner may swiftly become apparent on “precincts reporting” – by 1am it may already be clear that Obama is going to win Ohio and, notwithstanding what happened 12 years ago, bed becomes a serious option!

West Virginia should also by now be called for Romney.

If Virginia has not been called, look for any returns for Prince William County (which is more Democratic than the nation overall, but if it is much over 55% for Obama, his challenger is in trouble) and Henrico County (historically a reliable bellwether).

If Romney is leading 49-3 at this stage, it’s in line with expectations; if he is leading 64-3, it is definitely worth staying up!

01.00 GMT: Polls close in New Hampshire, and most polls close in Florida. Again, if New Hampshire is called, it is good news for the winner, although probably not decisive given the small number of electoral votes in play and fairly unrepresentative nature of the state (Romney has a residence there). Florida will not be called at this stage (that was the fundamental mistake made in 2000), but we may get some indication of Obama‘s lead outside the “Panhandle” and expect strong views on Twitter as to the likely winner at this point (remembering, again, Romney must win to have any realistic chance).

Pennsylvania also closes at this time - Obama is highly likely to win, but if it is not called, this is good news (or consolation, depending on how others have gone) for Romney.

Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma and Tennessee should be called for Romney at this time; and Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Rhode Island for Obama. 

One of Maine’s congressional districts may not be called at this stage (which would be good news for Romney if matched by similar outcomes elsewhere, but mathematically cannot make any difference if my above assumptions are correct).

If Ohio has not yet been called, look out for Cuyahoga County (essentially Cleveland), which Obama should win by 2:1 – much more than that, and he’s safe; much less, and Romney is in with a chance. Conversely, Romney would really need to win Hamilton County (Cincinnati) to have any chance of taking the state.

Polls also close in the District of Columbia - we can already safely “call” it for Obama!

In Florida, if still not yet called, look out for returns from Hillsborough County (Tampa), a reliable bellwether which has gone with the state’s overall winner for the past half century. Romney will also want to hold on to a long-standing Republican advantage in Duval County (Jacksonville), to get a buffer for poorer returns from Miami-Dade.

If Obama has taken the lead at this point (he should be on anywhere from 97 to 117, with Romney on 92 to 107), he is the likely winner – but if it is still within that range, it is probably worth keeping at least one eye open, and if he is not yet ahead, keep wide awake!

02.00 GMT: Polls close in Colorado. It is highly unlikely it will be “called” immediately – however, a lot of its votes have already been cast, so it shouldn’t take long to get a clear idea who has won unless it is incredibly close.

By now, Arkansas, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska (including its congressional districts), South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming should have been called for Romney.

New York will be called for Obama immediately; polls also close at this time in New Mexico, Minnesota and Michigan and Obama will win all of these – but if any of them are not called upon polls closing, and Romney is still in contention overall, we are in for a long night!

By now, the key states of Florida, Ohio and Virginia should have been “called” on the basis of on-going counts even if they were not immediately after polls closed. If none of them has been called for Obama by now, Romney is at least still in the race.

If Obama is on 180+ at this stage, he is the winner – and it’s time for bed.

If Romney is on 250+ at this stage, he is the winner – and the pollsters are all out of business!

If neither of the above applies, Obama is much below 175, and Romney is above 195, it is close – time for a strong coffee!

03.00 GMT: Presumably, if we are still watching, none of Florida, Ohio, Virginia or Colorado is yet absolutely clear (at least not in favour of Obama), and Romney has won North Carolina.

At this stage, Montana and Utah should be called for Romney; polls close in Iowa and Nevada; if either of these is not immediately called for Obama and he remains 20-30 behind, it’s time for another strong coffee!

04.00 GMT: Polls close in California, whose 55 electoral votes should take Obama past 270 at this stage and confirm his election, particularly if combined with the 19 he should receive from the Pacific North West states of Oregon and Washington and 4 from his native Hawaii.

Romney should be confirmed winner in Idaho and North Dakota at this point – if this is anything more than consolation, we are either in for litigation or the challenger has pulled off an upset victory (with 4 further votes from Alaska to come an hour later).

05.00 GMT: All polls have closed – why are you still awake?!